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This article examines the effectiveness of methods that are designed to
provide structure and support to decision making. Those that are primarily
aimed at individual decision makers are examined first and then attention is
turned to groups. In each case weaknesses of unaided decision making are
identified and how successful the application of formal methods is likely to be
in mitigating these weaknesses is assessed.
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Introduction
This chapter examines the effectiveness of methods that are designed to
provide structure and support to decision making. Those that are primarily
aimed at individual decision makers are examined first and then attention is
turned to groups. In each case weaknesses of unaided decision making are
identified and how successful the application of formal methods is likely to be
in mitigating these weaknesses is assessed.
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Individual Decision Making
Supporting Decisions Involving Multiple Objectives
To make decisions, humans have evolved simplified mental strategies, or
heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). These heuristics are well adapted
to some environments and can be particularly useful where quick decisions
need to be made with minimal cognitive effort (e.g., choose a brand of coffee
that you recognize rather than an unknown brand) (Gigerenzer et al. 1999).
However, consider the problem of choosing a used car. The car buyer
is likely to have a diverse set of objectives. The application of one well‐
known heuristic, lexicographic ranking (Tversky 1969), would involve the
buyer simply comparing the cars on the attribute that is judged to be most
important (e.g., price) and selecting the car that performs best on this
attribute. If several cars offer the best performance on this attribute (i.e., if
there is a tie) then performance on the second most important attribute will
be compared and so on. Clearly, the heuristic avoids complexity by making
no attempt to consider all of the attributes associated with the cars or to
consider trade‐offs between them—a car that was rejected because it was
relatively expensive may offer other features that would have more than
compensated for its greater cost. A more demanding heuristic, elimination
by aspects (EBA) (Tversky 1972), would consider all of the cars features.
Cars would be eliminated from consideration if they failed to meet a minimal
requirement on any attribute. For example, any car that had a top speed of
below 90 mph would be ruled out, as would any car that did not have electric
windows, and so on. However, EBA still fails to consider trade‐offs between
the attributes. Thus, a car that was rejected because it had a top speed of
only 85 mph might have had many other desirable features that would have
made it worth purchasing despite its slightly lower top speed. Such heuristics
characterize the way in which busy decision makers make choices between
alternatives with multiple objectives.
A number of methods have been developed to support decision makers faced
with multiple objectives. These methods, which fall within the discipline of
decision analysis, include the simple multiattribute rating technique (SMART)
(Edwards 1971), the simple multiattribute rating technique exploiting ranks
(SMARTER) (Edwards and Barron 1994), the analytic hierarchy process (AHP)
(Saaty 1990), and outranking (e.g., Roy 1991). The common idea underlying
these methods is that the complexity of the judgments required from the
decision maker can be reduced if the problem is decomposed into a set
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of separate smaller problems—the so‐called divide and conquer principle.
The decision maker can then apply his or her judgments to each of these
(hopefully) simpler problems in turn. The resulting judgments are then
recomposed, in accordance with a set of axioms, so that the best course of
action can be identified.
For example, in SMART the objectives are decomposed into “subobjectives”
that are specific enough for the decision maker to make a relatively
straightforward comparison of how well the options perform on that
subobjective. Thus the objective of minimizing pollution might be
decomposed into subobjectives of minimizing CO2 emissions, minimizing
sulphur emissions, and minimizing noise. Each subobjective is then
considered separately and independently, and the options rated according to
their performance on that subobjective (usually on a 0 to 100 scale). Weights
are then assigned to these subobjectives to reflect their importance in the
decision (technically swing weights should be used, see Goodwin and Wright
2004) and the “best” option is identified as the one achieving the highest
weighted average score.
It can be seen that SMART enables the decision maker to take into account
all of the objectives that are pertinent to the decision (unlike lexicographic
ranking). Furthermore, by requiring the assignment of weights, it also
ensures that the decision maker evaluates trade‐offs between these
objectives (unlike EBA).
However, there are several other advantages that emanate from this
formal structuring of the decision process. The decision model, at the
heart of the technique, automatically documents the rationale for the
decision, effectively providing an audit trail that allows the reasons for the
decision to be made explicit and, if necessary, defended. Also, methods
like SMART are straightforward and transparent so that individuals from
a range of specialisms can easily participate in the process and see how
their judgments impact on the overall decision. Participation, in turn, can
lead to a commitment to the chosen course of action. Decision makers can
also use the “common language” of the model to clearly communicate
their thinking to other participants (French 1996). Where there are disputes
between individual decision makers about the weights to assign to different
objectives, sensitivity analysis can often reveal that the same decision
should be made regardless of which set of proposed weights is used, thereby
avoiding unnecessary debate. Finally, the recommendations of the model
may seem counter‐intuitive to the decision makers upon whose judgments it
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is based. However, this challenge to intuition can serve to motivate decision
makers to explore their problem more deeply. Indeed Phillips (1984) argues
that formal decision models can be at their most valuable when these
discrepancies occur because the ensuing exploration yields deeper insights
and understanding of the issues. This in turn leads to enhancements of the
model until eventually the intuitive view and the model converge, at which
point the model is described as being “requisite”. (The section on decision
conferencing explores this idea further.)
Published examples of the application of SMART include the selection of a
wide area network system by a logistics company (Marples and Robertson
1993), systems acquisition decisions by the US military (Buede and Bresnick
1992), the selection of a clinical information system (Graeber 2001), priority
setting for research funds by the New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture (Mabin
et al. 2001), the design of a
bioreserve network in Canada (Rothley 1999), and fisheries management in
the Shetland Islands (Hilden 1997).
The role of these models is not to take the responsibility for decisions from
decision makers or to identify “optimal” courses of action. Instead, they
merely provide support and their purpose is to yield insights and to promote
creativity so that better informed decisions can be made. However, even
in this support role their usefulness is not assured. As Goodwin and Wright
(1993) point out, decomposition is unlikely to aid judgment where the
decision maker is skeptical about the technique that is being employed. For
example, there may be a reluctance to try to represent one's preferences,
particularly for qualitative attributes, on a numeric scale (Boyle 2000).
Decomposition is also likely to be unsuccessful where the judgments required
by the technique are poorly understood, or are less familiar and more
complex than the holistic judgments that the decision maker may be used to
making. Similar problems are likely to occur when the number of judgments
required by the decomposition increases to a level where the decision maker
experiences fatigue or boredom.
There are two further potential limitations associated with the application of
structured models to decisions made by individuals where there are multiple
objectives. The first relates to a criticism by Keeney that traditional decision
analysis methods are “alternative focused” in that they start with a list of
alternative courses of action (Keeney 1992), allowing the decision maker to
focus on the objectives that he or she would like to achieve. Keeney argues
that this sequencing of the process severely restricts the decision maker's
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perception of opportunities that may be available. Values are fundamental
to decision making and therefore any support method should commence
with the recognition and articulation of these values—so called “value
focused thinking.” In this way the decision maker will be enabled to identify
opportunities and create better alternatives. Such an approach would seem
to be particularly appropriate for major strategic decisions where there
may be a need to review and explore the key values and objectives of an
organization and to develop innovative ways forward. However, Keeney's
approach, perhaps, would be enhanced if it provided more guidance on how
fundamental values might be identified. Exhortations to ask yourself, “What
would you like to achieve in this situation?” and, “If you had no limitations at
all, what would your objectives be?” may not be sufficient to stimulate the
creativity required. Wright and Goodwin (1999a) discuss this issue in more
detail.
The second potential limitation of structured modeling approaches is that
they can serve to reinforce the decision maker's existing decision frame
(i.e., his or her current way of defining the decision problem) when “thinking
outside the box” is likely to lead to a superior solution. There is nothing
inherent in the application of decision analysis models that will cause the
decision maker to question the frame and this may lead to considerable
effort being wasted on solving the “wrong” problem. This suggests that, in
many circumstances, “softer” techniques, such as
scenario planning or soft systems analysis, should be used to explore the
dimensions, nature, and context of the problem first (see, e.g., Rosenhead
and Mingers 2001).
Supporting Decisions Involving Risk and Uncertainty
When faced with the complex task of assessing risk, it appears that people
again resort to the use of heuristics. While these heuristics can allow risks to
be assessed quickly and efficiently in some circumstances their use is also
associated with biased judgments.
For example, the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) is
invoked when people assess the probability of an event according to how
easily similar events can be recalled or imagined. Thus the probability of
a major corporate customer going into receivership may be judged to be
higher if the person making the assessment can recall a recent example of
the bankruptcy of a similar company. Such assessments will be biased when
ease of recall or ease of imagination are not associated with the true risk.
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Thus rare events, that have been highlighted in the media precisely because
they are rare, may be overassessed in terms of their risk, while mundane
events that pass largely unnoticed but actually pose greater dangers will
have their risks underestimated.
Another heuristic, anchoring and adjustment, is employed when people are
required to provide a numerical estimate of a quantity. It involves starting
with an initial estimate, the anchor, and adjusting from it to obtain the
final estimate. Problems arise when the anchor is a long way from the true
value of the quantity because people tend to make insufficient adjustment
from it. For example, suppose it is thought that the most likely time that it
will take to launch a new product is 35 weeks, but a pessimistic estimate
is also required (assume that this will be a launch time that only has a 1
percent chance of being exceeded). It is likely that the 35 weeks will act as
an anchor and the pessimistic estimate will be set too close to it. This may
lead to insufficient contingency planning for a launch that turns out to be
considerably delayed.
Many other biases have been documented when people face uncertainty
and risk. In estimating the costs and durations of major projects there
is usually a bias towards optimism (indeed several UK government web
sites provide optimism bias calculators that are intended to enable the
effect of this bias to be removed from estimates). Similarly, when people
receive new information that should cause them to substantially revise their
original estimates they tend to display conservatism in that they pay too
little attention to this information and make insufficient changes to their
estimates.
Can managers be helped to produce better assessments of the risk they
face? As in the case of multiobjective decision support, decomposition
methods seek to improve the accuracy of management judgment by
breaking the assessment task down into smaller tasks. Typical tools include
probability trees and fault trees. In
the former, a tree diagram is used to depict the sequences of events that
need to occur for the target event to take place. For example, suppose
that it is necessary to assess the risk of an explosion at a chemical plant
in the course of a year. Rather than assessing the probability directly the
combinations of events that might lead to an explosion are identified (e.g.,
leakage of a coolant and overheating of a processor and failure of a reserve
cooling system and failure of a shutdown mechanism). Probabilities are
estimated separately for these precursor events and the rules of probability
Page 7 of 27 Structuring the Decision Process: An Evaluation of Methods
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2013. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: University of Strathclyde; date: 10 September 2013
(e.g., the multiplication rule) are applied to combine the estimates and
obtain the desired probability. Fault trees adopt a similar procedure. Note
that the decomposition procedure allows the decision maker to focus on
each precursor event separately, rather than being forced to consider
simultaneously all of the combinations of events that might impact on the
target event.
Risk analysis based on simulation, is another decomposition‐based approach
to assessing risks. Consider the problem of assessing the probability that
an investment in a new confectionery product will yield a negative net
present value (NPV). The manager making the assessment would first be
asked to identify all of the factors that would affect the NPV (e.g., the price
of raw materials, manufacturing costs, packaging costs, distribution costs,
the extent of competition from rival companies, and sales). For each of
these factors a probability distribution would be elicited. A computer risk
analysis package would then be used. For example, if it was estimated that
there was a 5 percent chance that raw material costs would exceed £5
per tonne then there would only be a 5 percent chance of the simulated
combination including raw material costs of over £5. The package would then
calculate the NPV that would result from the combination. After repeating
this simulation process thousands of times the proportion of combinations
resulting in a negative NPV could be obtained. Recent published examples
of risk analysis include its use in designing corporate investment, financing,
and risk management strategies for financially constrained firms (Casey
2001), decisions relating to the restoration of contaminated land (Oberg and
Bergback 2005) and oil and gas estimates for a region of Alaska (Rocha‐
Legorreta and Lerche 2004).
Decisions involving risk and uncertainty often have another attribute that
creates further difficulties for the unaided decision maker: a complex
structure. Events may occur in the future that require further decisions to
be made or rule out other options. For example, if a decision is made to
launch a new product but first year sales are low then a subsequent decision
on whether to advertise, relaunch or abandon the product will need to be
faced. Decision trees enable this sort of complexity to be represented in
a diagrammatic format so that the decision maker can understand the
underlying structure of the problem and communicate it to others. Published
applications where decision trees have been found to be effective tools
include decisions on petroleum exploration (Hess 1993), a decision on
automation by the US postal service (Ulvila 1987), forestry management
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decisions (Cohan et al. 1984), management‐union bargaining (Winter 1985),
and a decision on an auction bid for the salvage rights of a ship (Bell 1984).
There are limitations associated with these techniques. Many of the potential
problems of decomposition that were discussed earlier can reduce the
effectiveness of probability and fault trees and risk analysis. For highly
complex problems, decision trees can become “bushy messes” and the
benefits of clarity that they bring to the decision process can be lost.
Decision trees also emphasize the alternative focused approach to decision
making criticized by Keeney (Keeney 1992), and they require estimates
of probabilities, which may be subject to biases. Indeed, the fundamental
structure of decision trees encourages the assumption that outcomes and
risks are predicated on the course of action that is being selected. Thus they
might reinforce managers' existing views of the world and not alert them to
potential changes that could have serious implications for their business.
Wright and Goodwin (1999b) discuss this issue in more detail.
Support for Groups of Decision Makers
Do groups of individual decision makers make better decisions than the
average of the individuals who make up the groups? This section of the
chapter reviews research into the quality of group judgment and then
considers the ways that have been proposed and implemented to aid the
judgment of groups of individuals.
Unstructured Group Decision Making
One of the major conclusions of research work on descriptions of group
decision making is that of shortcomings. Irving Janis (1982) has documented
a phenomenon that he has termed “groupthink” within group decision
processes. Groupthink is essentially the suppression of ideas that are
critical of the “direction” in which a group is moving. It is reflected in a
tendency to concur with the position or views that are perceived to be
favored by the group. Of course, such forces may produce speedy judgments
and commitment to action. However, such cohesive groups may develop
rationalizations for the invulnerability of the group's decision and inhibit
the expression of critical ideas. These pitfalls of groupthink are likely to
result in an incomplete survey of alternative courses of action or choices.
Such an incomplete search through the decision space may result in a
failure to examine the risks of preferred decisions and a failure to work out
contingency plans if the preferred course of action cannot be taken.
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Overall, there have been very few laboratory tests of Janis's theory. One
main reason is that laboratory researchers have found it difficult to achieve
high levels of group cohesiveness, a primary antecedent of groupthink.
Another approach to the verification of the theory has been the study of case
histories.
One study, by Esser and Lindoerfer (1989) analyzed the decision to launch
the space shuttle Challenger on January 29, 1986. The outcome of that
flight—the death of all seven crewmembers within minutes of launch—
focused attention on the process leading to the decision to launch. In these
researchers' content analysis of the verbal transcripts of a presidential
commission report on the disaster, statements therein were coded as
either positive or negative instances of the observable antecedents and
consequences of groupthink. During the 24 hours prior to the launch of the
Challenger the ratio of positive to negative items increased significantly.
During this time, the Level III NASA management were facing increased
difficulties in maintaining their flight schedule, and this was expressed
as direct pressure on the dissenters who wanted to delay the flight (the
engineers) and “mindguarding”. Mindguarding essentially refers to the
removal of doubts and uncertainties in communications to others. In this
instance, the Level III NASA management said to the engineers that they
would report the engineers' concerns to the Level II NASA management, but
they did not.
Janis argues that the group‐based “victims” of groupthink feel invulnerable in
their decision making and so fail to re‐appraise initially rejected alternative
courses of action and do not search for information that could disconfirm the
selected course of action—the so‐called confirmation bias. Edmondson et al.
(2005) provide a discussion of groupthink as a potential explanation of the
second ill‐fated shuttle launch—that of Columbia.
Structured Group Processes
Awareness of the factors that can degrade group decision making, combined
with the implicit belief that group judgment can potentially enhance decision
making, has led to a number of structured methods to enhance group
decision making by removing or restricting interpersonal interaction and
controlling information flow. One such major method has been Delphi.
Essentially, Delphi consists of an iterative process for making quantitative
judgments. The phases of Delphi are:
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1. Panelists provide opinions in answer to questions about issues
such as the likelihood of future events, when events will occur,
what the impact of events will be. These opinions are often given
as responses to questionnaires that are completed individually by
members of the panel.
2. After tallying the results, individual panelists are provided with
statistical feedback of the whole panel's opinions (e.g., range or
medians), before a
re‐polling takes place. At this stage, dissenting opinion is aired so
that anonymous discussion (often in written form) may occur.
3. The output of the Delphi technique is a quantified group
“consensus,” which is usually expressed as the median response of
the group of panelists.
After the feedback at phase 2, the Delphi method assumes that the median
response of the re‐polled individuals is likely to shift nearer to the true
value of the outcome to be predicted. Improvement is thought to result
from opinion changes in “swingers,” who change their less firmly grounded
opinions, and the opinion stability of “holdouts,” who are assumed to be
more accurate than “swingers.”
Indeed, Delphi was designed to improve upon the traditional group by adding
structure to the process. Results generally suggest that Delphi groups are
more accurate than traditional groups. Rowe and Wright (1999, 2001) found
that Delphi groups outperformed traditional groups by a score of five studies
to one, with two ties, and with one study showing task specific support for
both techniques.
The research studies seem to show that collections of individuals make
judgments that are more accurate and forecasts in Delphi groups than in
unstructured groups, and that Delphi should be used in preference. One point
of caution, however, is that the groups used in Delphi studies are usually
highly simplified versions of real‐world groups, comprising individuals with
a high degree of expertise who genuinely care about the result of their
meeting and have some knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of their
colleagues (or think they do). On this basis they may be able to selectively
accept or reject their opinions. It may be that in a richer environment, the
extra information and motivation brought to a task by those in a traditional
group may make it of greater value than the limiting Delphi procedure.
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Would it be Better to Simply Average the Forecasts of Several
Individuals Rather Than Use Delphi?
Averaging of probability forecasts, scores, or weightings is one approach
to reconciling differences in group judgments in applications of decision
analysis. Another approach is to conduct sensitivity analysis to see if
differences between individuals—in terms of probability judgments and
value scores/weights—have any impact on the decision recommended by
the modeling approach. Sensitivity analysis and averaging are a practical
response to situations where individuals differ in their assessments and
there is no “gold standard” against which to compare the relative validity of
individuals' assessments.
Researchers have compared the accuracy of such statistical groups to
Delphi groups in two ways: through a straightforward comparison of the two
approaches, and through a comparison of the quality of averaged estimates
on the first and the
final round in a Delphi procedure. The first, pre‐interaction, round is
equivalent to a statistical group in every way except for the instructions
given to individuals: Delphi panelists are led to expect further polling and
feedback from others, which may lead panelists to consider the problem
more deeply and possibly to make better “statistical group” judgments on
that first round than individuals who do not expect to have their estimates
used as feedback for others. A first round Delphi may, however, provide a
better benchmark for comparison than a separate statistical group, because
the panelists in the two “conditions” are the same, thus reducing a potential
source of great variance.
Rowe and Wright (2001) reviewed the evidence for the relative values
of statistical groups and Delphi groups. Although it should be possible
to compare averages over rounds in every study of Delphi accuracy or
quality, researchers in a number of evaluative studies have not reported the
differences between rounds (e.g., Fischer 1981; Riggs 1983). Nevertheless,
in their review of those studies that have examined such differences Rowe
and Wright found that results generally support the advantage of Delphi
groups over first round or statistical groups by a tally of 12 studies to two. In
five studies, the researchers reported significant increases in accuracy over
Delphi rounds. Seven more studies produced qualified support for Delphi: in
five cases, researchers found Delphi to be better than statistical or first round
groups more often than not, or to a degree that did not reach statistical
significance. Two further studies, found Delphi to be better under certain
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conditions but not others. Parenté et al. (1984) found that Delphi accuracy
was worse. The overall weight of empirical evidence, however, suggests that
Delphi groups should be used instead of statistical groups whenever feasible,
because generally they lead to judgments that are more accurate. This could
result from the additional interaction during Delphi following the averaging of
first round estimates.
Delphi has value in a number of situations. When experts are geographically
dispersed and unable to meet in a face to face group, Delphi would seem
an appropriate procedure. It enables members of different organizations
to address industry wide issues, or experts from different facilities within
a single organization to consider a problem without traveling to a single
location. Indeed, experts with diverse backgrounds are liable to have
different perspectives, terminologies, and frames of reference, which might
easily hinder effective communication in a traditional group. The facilitator
(or monitor team) can iron out such difficulties before the structured rounds
of a Delphi.
Delphi might also be appropriate when disagreements between individuals
are likely to be severe or politically unpalatable. Under such circumstances,
the quality of judgments and decisions is likely to suffer from motive
conflicts, personality clashes, and power games. Refereeing the group
process and ensuring anonymity should prove beneficial.
Rowe and Wright (2001) summarize the following principles for using expert
opinion in applications of Delphi:
• Use experts with appropriate domain knowledge.
• Use heterogeneous experts.
• Use between five and 20 experts.
• For Delphi feedback, provide the mean or median estimate of the
panel plus the rationales from all panelists for their estimates.
• Continue Delphi polling until the responses show stability;
generally, three structured rounds are enough.
• Obtain the final forecast by weighting all the experts' estimates
equally and aggregating them.
In contrast to Delphi techniques, decision conferencing presents a socially
interactive approach to decision making in order to generate a shared
understanding of a problem and to produce a commitment to action.
Page 13 of 27 Structuring the Decision Process: An Evaluation of Methods
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2013. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: University of Strathclyde; date: 10 September 2013
Decision Conferencing
Decision conferencing brings together decision analysis, group processes,
and information technology over an intensive two‐ or three‐day session
attended by people who wish to resolve a complex issue or decision. In this
context, a small group of people who have an input to a major decision often
sit on the perimeter of a round table and talk through their problem with a
decision analyst, who acts to facilitate group interactions and knowledge
sharing. In the background, another decision analyst uses interactive
decision aiding technology to model individual and group views on such
issues as multiattribute option evaluation and resource allocation. However,
as can be inferred from the earlier discussion of unaided decision making,
the outputs of such modeling seldom agree with unaided holistic judgments.
One major responsibility of the decision analyst is to explain the underlying
logic of the modeling methods to the decision makers. Only if the decision
makers can fully appreciate the methods are they likely to accept model‐
based choices over their own intuitive judgments. To quote Phillips (1984):
As the results of the modeling become available to the
participants, they compare these results to their holistic
judgments. It is the inevitable discrepancies that arise,
especially early in the modeling process, that drive the
dialectic. By exploring these discrepancies, understanding
deepens and changes and new perspectives are reflected back
as adjustments. Eventually, participants are satisfied with the
model and unable to derive any further insights from it…The
model has served its purpose.…(p. 32)
Phillips is concerned not to impose an optimal solution by black box methods:
If exploration of the discrepancy between holistic judgment
and model results show the model to be at fault, then the
model is not requisite—it is not yet sufficient to solve the
problem. The model can only be considered requisite when no
new intuitions emerge about the problem…Requisite models
are not produced from people's heads, they are generated
through the interaction of problem owners. (p. 34)
Participants gain a sense of common purpose and a commitment to action.
Sensitivity analysis allows participants to see if individual disagreements
make a difference in the final preferred alternative or decision. Decision
analytic principles provide a guide to action, not a black box prescription for
action.
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It is intuitively reasonable that discussions about decisions leading to
consensus are more likely to be implemented than the output prescriptions
of complex black box decision analyses, which involve but a single decision
maker who may well have to justify his or her decision to others in the
organization. In addition, decisions made by such groups are likely to be
“made” to work because of the group commitment.
Are such more or less valid than unaided judgment or prescriptive solutions?
For example, does the situational context of decision conferencing produce
conditions for groupthink? Phillips (1984) has argued that this is not so,
since:
1. Participants are not on home ground. Often decision conferences
take place in hotels or an especially designed room on the decision
analyst's premises.
2. The small group is carefully composed of people representing
all perspectives on the issue to be resolved so that adversarial
processes operate in the group to check bias and explore
alternative framings of the decision problem.
3. The decision analyst who acts to facilitate the conference is
a neutral outsider who is sensitive to the unhelpful effects of
groupthink and reflects this back to the group.
In a pioneering study, McCartt and Rohrbough (1989) addressed the problem
of evaluating the effectiveness of decision conferencing. These investigators
argued that attempts to link good decision outcomes to particular types of
group decision support are extraordinarily difficult, since virtually all real‐
world applications of group decision support do not provide enough baselines
of comparison (e.g., tests of alternative methods/techniques or alternative
decisions) to satisfy laboratory‐based experimental researchers.
For example, with group commitment, poor decisions may be “made” to
produce good outcomes, otherwise the credibility of the senior executives
who attended the decision conference would be in trouble. Good judgment
and decision making have been seen as one of the major characteristics of
good managers! McCartt and Rohrbough conclude that any assessment of
the effectiveness of a group decision process must look at the process itself
and not subsequent outcomes. In their study, these investigators followed
up a cross‐section of 14 decision conferences held by Decision Techtronics at
the State University of New York at Albany. Using mailed questionnaires, they
enquired about the perceived organizational benefits in the form of improved
information management, planning, efficiency, and morale. Effective decision
Page 15 of 27 Structuring the Decision Process: An Evaluation of Methods
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2013. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: University of Strathclyde; date: 10 September 2013
conferences were found to be ones where participants perceived real benefit
in the support of the decision analysis techniques and in the opportunity for
open and extended discussion about the
models that had been built. Ineffective decision conferences were
characterized by executive teams who convened to discuss a problem but
felt little pressure to reach consensus or construct a plan of action.
Scenario Planning
The practice of scenario planning implicitly accepts that managers are not
able to make valid assessments of the likelihood of unique future events and
that “best guesses” of what the future may hold may be wrong. Advocates
also argue that it can counter groupthink by allowing minority opinions about
the future to have “airtime,” relative to majority opinion, although not always
successfully (see, e.g., Hodgkinson and Wright 2002).
A scenario is not a forecast of the future. Multiple scenarios are pen‐pictures
of a range of plausible futures. Each individual scenario has an infinitesimal
probability of actual occurrence but it is possible to construct the range of
a set of individual scenarios in such a way as to bound the uncertainties
that are seen to be inherent in the future—like the edges on the boundaries
surrounding a multidimensional space.
Scenarios focus on key uncertainties and certainties about the future and
use this information to construct pen‐pictures in an information rich way in
order to provide vivid descriptions of future worlds. In contrast, subjective
probabilities entered into a decision tree provide numerical values that
can be used in an expected utility calculation. The judgment process that
produced such values is often not justified. When individuals disagree about
their subjective probabilities for a critical event within decision analysis,
practice is often to take an average, or weighted average. The relationship
between the critical uncertainties, important predetermined trends (such as
demographics, e.g., the proportion of the US population who are in various
age bands in, say, ten years' time) and the behavior of actors who have
a stake in the particular future (and who will tend to act to preserve and
enhance their own interests within that future) are thought through in the
process of scenario planning such that the resultant pen‐pictures are, in fact,
seen as plausible to those who have constructed the scenarios.
The outcome of the decision process in scenario planning is not the selection
of the option with the highest expected value or utility but the selection of
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the most “robust” decision in the face of an unpredictable future. However,
even if the development of a fundamentally robust option is not possible,
scenario thinking also provides other benefits. Communication of world views
can be easy in an organization via the medium of the scenario “stories”.
Additionally, rehearsing a future can provide a better understanding of the
reasons underlying a situation. Thus, once the early events in a scenario
occur, the decision maker will be able to anticipate how the future will unfold.
These trigger events will be seen as information among the stream of data
that impacts upon the decision maker.
Table 28.1 The Components of the Three Techniques to Aid Group‐Based
Decision Making
Scenario planning Decision analysis Delphi
Future orientation: Scenario planning
constructs multiple
frames of the
future.
Decision analysis
is conventionally
undertaken within
a single general
frame of the future.
Delphi is usually
focused on
forecasting the
occurrence of a
single event or
quantity.
Structure of
judgment inputs:
Structuring
is achieved
by qualitative
decomposition
into critical
uncertainties
and trends. An
emphasis on
understanding
causality.
Structuring is
achieved by
quantitative
decomposition
into probabilities,
payoffs, and
decision trees or
values and weights.
Structuring is
achieved by
the controlled
exchange of
information
between
anonymous
panelists over a
number of rounds
(iterations).
Information
orientation:
Scenario team
members exchange
existing opinions on
issues of concern
and systematically
provide insight on
issues of critical
uncertainty.
Fresh information
may be sought
if the analysis
indicates that a
decision is sensitive
to small changes in
judgmental inputs.
Expert panelists
exchange their
existing estimates.
Individual experts
can hold, or
change, their
estimates on the
basis of feedback
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of the estimates of
other panelists.
Process
orientations:
Dissenting opinions
are given “airtime”
that is preserved,
and combined
with the opinions
of others, while
maintaining
divergence.
Divergent opinions
are combined by
averaging and
reduction.
The statistical
average of the
estimates on the
final Delphi round is
taken as the group
judgment.
Action orientation: The result is shared
understanding
within the
management
team, of causally
determined futures
that can galvanize
managerial
action to avoid
unfavorable futures
or facilitate the
occurrence of
favorable ones.
The result of the
analysis is a single
recommended
decision for
subsequent
implementation.
None.
Just as the new purchaser of a particular make of car becomes very sensitive
to the number of models of that make on the road and the differences
in levels of equipment, etc., the scenario thinker becomes sensitive to a
scenario starting to unfold and becoming reality. Such sensitivity can lead
to early contingency action towards an unfavorable future (see Wright
and Goodwin 1999b; Wright et al. 2004). Alternatively, new business
opportunities can be quickly grasped as soon as favorable scenarios begin to
unfold. Some practitioners see early recognition and reaction to an emerging
future as more useful than the creation of robust strategic options (see van
der Heijden et al. 2002).
Typical outcomes of the scenario planning process include:
1. Confirmation that the business idea is sound or that new
strengths need to be added to create more robustness.
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2. Confirmation that lower level business choices are sound or that
alternative new options are more robust.
3. Recognition that none of the business options are robust and,
therefore, contingency planning against unfavorable futures is
necessary.
4. Sensitivity to the “early warning” elements that are precursors of
desirable and unfavorable futures.
Often, in practice, scenario workshops invoke an “organizational jolt” to
routine, “business as usual,” thinking. A major insight can be that continuing
with business as usual is a fragile strategy against the constructed futures.
Wright et al. (2004), and Cairns et al. (2004, 2006) discuss these issues in
more detail.
Comparative views on scenario planning, decision analysis, and Delphi as
aids to group decision making are given in Table 28.1.
Conclusions
This chapter has illustrated the use of heuristics in unaided decision making
at both the individual and small group level of analysis. In individual decision
making, individuals tend to use simplified mental strategies to make choices
between multiattributed alternatives. Such strategies often don't involve
trade‐offs and so are non‐compensatory. By contrast, decision aiding
techniques such as SMART, SMARTER, and the AHP aid the decision maker to
make trade‐offs and so provide support in compensatory decision making.
These decision tools have been used in a wide variety of practical business
applications. Such compensatory decision aiding techniques are based on the
principle of decomposing the decision maker's judgmental task into attribute
identification, value scoring, and attribute weighting. The recomposition of
these judgments, via the decision modeling, is
likely to challenge the decision maker's unaided choice preference. This
challenge is the essential value of the decision aiding approach. A similar
approach, that of decomposition and recomposition of judgmental estimates,
underpins the decision aiding of decisions involving risk and uncertainty.
In such decisions, also, heuristics are commonly used by busy decision
makers assessing the likelihood of future events. Here, techniques such
as fault trees, risk analysis, and decision analysis rebuild decomposed
judgmental assessments in ways that will, likely, also challenge unaided,
holistic intuition.
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With the sphere of group decision making, Delphi can aid convergence
of opinion between group members through anonymous interaction. The
structuring of group interaction can overcome the process loss inherent in
unstructured groups—such as the domination by assertive and talkative
individuals. In contrast, decision conferencing and scenario planning
interventions allow group members to interact but the interaction is
moderated by facilitators who either: (1) implement decision analysis
technologies; or (2) implement scenario construction methodologies. As
in individual decision making, both decision conferencing and scenario
construction, involve the decomposition, and subsequent recomposition, of
judgment. As was shown, Delphi, decision analysis and scenario planning can
be compared and contrasted in terms of differences in: (1) future orientation;
(2) structure of judgmental inputs; (3) information orientation; (4) process
orientation; and (5) action orientation.
In summary, there exists a range of methods to aid both individual and group
decision making. This chapter has described and contrasted the domains of
applicability of a range of well utilized decision aiding technologies. The key,
of course, is to match particular methods to particular decision situations.
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